

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00

EUR-12 ACDA-05 MC-02 AID-05 IGA-02 EB-07 OMB-01

TRSE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 /091 W

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O R 021804Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3706

INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN

AMEMBASSY BAMAKO

AMEMBASSY CONAKRY

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

AMEMBASSY RABAT

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 DAKAR 0641

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MILI, PFOR, IV

SUBJ: REGIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT STUDY: SENEGAL

REF: STATE 020621

1. SUMMARY: SENEGALESE ARMED FORCES ARE MODEST, WITH LIMITED CAPABILITY FOR OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE ACTION. EXPANSION PROGRAM TO BE COMPLETED BY 1985 REPORTEDLY WILL BRING MILITARY TO 14,000 MEN. AIR FORCE IS ACQUIRING FIRST JET FIGHTER/ TRAINERS. HOWEVER, BUILD-UP IS OF MODEST CHARACTER, GIVEN DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET ROLE IN

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NEIGHBORING STATES. SENGHOR FAVORS "DIALOGUE" TO RESOLVE

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS AND SEEKS COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS. IN ABSENCE OF BUDGETARY RESTRAINTS, GOS WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO RUSH INTO UNPROGRAMMED ACCESSIONS OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS; ON OTHER HAND, CURRENT SECURITY CONCERNS WOULD NOT PERMIT SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION BELOW PRESENT RATE OF PLANNED ACQUISITION. FRENCH HAVE DOMINANT POSITION HISTORICALLY AND US SECURITY GUARANTEES ARE UNLIKELY TO BE VIEWED WITH MUCH INTEREST, PARTICULARLY IF FNLA/UNITA FACTION IN ANGOLA IS OVERWHELMED. U.S. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN PLEDGE OF SOVIET RESTRAINT IN ARMS SUPPLY TO AFRICA MIGHT BE WELCOMED, BUT INTRA-AFRICAN ARMS RESTRAINT PROGRAM WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO ORIGINATE WITH OAU. HOWEVER, OAU UNLIKELY TO ENDORSE UNILATERAL ARMS RESTRAINT WHILE FACING CONTINUED LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. END SUMMARY.

2. PERSONNEL IN SENEGAL'S ARMED FORCES CURRENTLY NUMBER UNDER 7,000 (WITH ANOTHER 5,000 IN PARAMILITARY GENDARMERIE AND SURETE). ARMED FORCES MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND ARE INVOLVED IN CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS, BUT HAVE LIMITED CAPABILITY FOR OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE ACTION. TANKS ARE NONEXISTENT, AS ARE SOPHISTICATED RADAR, MISSILES OR OTHER ADVANCED SYSTEMS. (GENDARMERIE AND SURETE HAVE NO MAJOR EQUIPMENT). UPON INDEPENDENCE, GOS EMBARKED ON PROGRAM TO INCREASE DEFENSE LEVELS WHICH WILL NOT BE COMPLETED FOR ANOTHER 5-10 YEARS. ARMED FORCES WILL PROBABLY BE INCREASED TO ABOUT 14,000 (CF USDAO IR 6-886-0068-75). AIR FORCE, WHICH HAS CURRENT PRIORITY IN BUILD-UP, HAS REPORTEDLY PURCHASED FIVE FOUGA MAGISTER JET FIGHTER-TRAINERS FOR DELIVERY IN 1976, GIVING SENEGAL ITS FIRST JET FIGHTER/TRAINER CAPABILITY. AIRLIFT CAPABILITY OF FIVE DC-3S WHICH BARELY GIVES SENEGAL RESOURCES TO AIRLIFT AND AIR-DROP ONE PARATROOPER COMPANY MAY BE DOUBLED IN 1976 WITH PURCHASE FROM FRANCE OF THREE NORD 2500 TROOP CARRIERS. NAVY, WHICH PRESENTLY HAS FOUR MOTOR GUNBOATS AND THREE LANDING CRAFT, HAS ORDERED FOUR MORE PATROL CRAFT.

3. BUILD-UP OF SENEGALESE FORCES IS THUS OF MODEST CHARACTER, PARTICULARLY WHEN VIEWED AGAINST SUCH REGIONAL DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS AS UNSTABLE SITUATION IN SPANISH SAHARA,

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PRESENCE OF SIGNIFICANT SOVIET/CHINESE MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN MALI, USSR AIR AND NAVAL OPERATIONS OUT OF CONAKRY AND SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE OF SOVIET PERSONNEL IN GUINEA-BISSAU. PRESIDENT SENGHOR HAS BEEN STRONG PROPONENT OF "DIALOGUE" AS UNIQUE AFRICAN METHOD OF PROMOTING PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS (IN MIDDLE EAST AND ANGOLA AS WELL AS IN SPANISH SAHARA AND CLOSER TO HOME). IN CASE OF MINUSCULE GAMBIA NEIGHBOR SURROUNDED BY SENEGAL,

GOS HAS DISAVOWED ANY INTENTION OF FORCEFULLY IMPOSING ITS WILL ON WEAKER STATE, WITH WHICH IT INSTEAD MAINTAINS CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS. RELATIONSHIP WITH FRANCE REMAINS KEY TO DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. IN AFTERMATH OF 1974 REDUCTIONS IN FORCE, FRENCH MILITARY PERSONNEL HERE NUMBER 1000-1200. MATERIEL, TRAINING AND OTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAVE BEEN ALMOST ALL FRENCH.

4. IF ARMS WERE FREE OF BUDGETARY RESTRAINTS WERE REMOVED, GOS MIGHT PROCURE SOME ARMS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO RUSH INTO EXTENSIVE ACCUMULATION OF EITHER PREVIOUSLY UNPROGRAMMED ACCESSIONS OR OF CURRENTLY UNPLANNED SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES WOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE AND, IN ANY CASE, SENEGALESE MILITARY PLANNERS ARE AWARE THAT RAPID ACQUISITION WITHOUT PRE-PLANNED TRAINING OF OPERATORS AND MECHANICS AND PRE-POSITIONED LOGISTICS SUPPORT WOULD BE DOOMED TO FAILURE.

5. ON OTHER HAND, NEED TO COMPENSATE FOR SCALED-DOWN FRENCH MILITARY PRESENCE, PROMINENT SOVIET ACTIVITY IN REGION, CONTINUING ESTRANGEMENT BETWEEN GUINEA AND SENEGAL, AND ESCALATING SAHARA CONFLICT GIVE RISE TO REAL GOS SECURITY CONCERNS WHICH ARE UNLIKELY TO PERMIT REDUCTION OF EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION RATES BELOW MODEST PROGRAMMED LEVELS. CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO WITHDRAWAL OF SENEGALESE CONTINGENT FROM UNEF FORCE IN SINAI ILLUSTRATES DEPTH OF GOS CONCERN (DAKAR 0527).

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

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NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 /091 W

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O R 021804Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3707

INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN  
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO  
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT  
AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH

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6. IF, IN ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE AMERICAN SUPPORT, FNL/UNITA FACTIONS IN ANGOLA ARE OVERWHELMED BY MPLA IN SPITE OF VOCAL US OPPOSITION AND INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, AMERICAN POLITICAL AND SECURITY GUARANTEES ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE VIEWED BY FRIENDLY AFRICAN NATIONS AS OFFERING CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO MAINTAINING ADEQUATE MILITARY FORCES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. IN ANY CASE TRADITIONAL SENEGALESE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH FRENCH RAMAINS KEY CONCERN IN MILITARY PLANNING. WE SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT SENEGALESE MIGHT WELCOME EXPLICIT US AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION UNDER WHICH LATTER COULD BE INDUCED TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA. IF PERCEIVED AS EFFECTIVE,

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SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD HELP REASSURE SENEGALESE THAT THEY WERE IN SUFFICIENTLY SECURE POSITION TO CONTEMPLATE RESTRAINT IN MILITARY ACQUISITION.

7. FOR REGIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT SYSTEM TO BE PALATABLE. IT WOULD MOST LIKELY HAVE TO ORIGINATE WITH OAU WHERE PRESENT DEEP DIVISIONS OVER ANGOLA, SPANISH SAHARA AND OTHER ISSUES SEEM UNLIKELY TO FACILITATE EARLY PROGRESS ON MUTUAL MILITARY REDUCTIONS. ANY REGIONAL GROUP INVOLVED IN ARMS RESTRAINT PROGRAM WOULD HAVE TO BE LARGE ENOUGH TO ALLEVIATE ITS MEMBERS' FEARS OVER THREAT POSED BY NON-MEMBERS. EMBASSY DOUBTS THAT THERE WOULD BE MUCH PREPAREDNESS AMONG OAU COUNTRIES TO EXERCISE UNILATERAL ARMS RESTRAINT IN FACE OF UNRESOLVED LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND MASSIVE MILITARY STRENGTH OF SOUTH AFRICANS. IN THIS PERSPECTIVE, MORE EFFECTIVE US SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WOULD PROBABLY BE MOST APPEALING INCENTIVE IN BLACK AFRICAN EYES FOR THEM TO CONTEMPLATE ARMS RESTRAINT. AGGREY

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